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Once again, an attempt to establish 
democracy in Russia has been short- 
lived. Throughout Russia's entire his- 
tory, democratic forms of government 
have been sporadic. Most of the time, 
the country has been ruled either indi- 
vidually or collectively by autocrats; 
monarchy survived in Russia long af- 
ter it was abolished in European coun- 
tries. The rule of the czar was truly 
dictatorial. Even when the ruling czar 
allowed for the formation of the State 
Duma (parliament), its activities were 
kept under his thumb. When the State 
Duma attempted to become independ- 
ent of the czar, it was dissolved and 
new elections were called for. All three 
Dumas which existed in Russia before 
the 1917 Revolution had this fate. In 
the Soviet era, democracy was also il- 
lusory. The Soviets of Peoples' Depu- 
ties at all levels took orders primarily 
from their national party bosses, and 
next from the regional party bosses. 
Even the electoral candidates to the 
Soviets had to be approved by the 
Party, and only the most loyal Party 
members were selected. 
The 1990 parliamentary election 
was the first democratic election in 
Russia. During the September-October 
1993 confrontation between Yeltsin 
and Parliament, the media, both in 
Russia and in the West, were quick to 
point out that Parliament was control- 
led by former Communists. This fact 
was meant to explain the clash be- 
tween Parliament and the President. 
What was rarely mentioned was that 
both Parliamentary Speaker Ruslan 
Khasbulatov and Vice-president Alex- 
ander Rutskoi stood by Yeltsin during 
the failed August 1991 coup--both of 
them were Yeltsin appointees. The 
Constitutional Court, headed by 
Valery Zorkin, was also founded by 
Yeltsin as an organ to approve political 
and economic reforms. Most members 
of the so-called "hard-liner" Parlia- 
ment were actually staunch support- 
ers of the market and political reforms 
being pursued by Yeltsin. Among the 
deputies still in Parliament on October 
4, 1993 was 33-year-old Oleg 
Rumyantsev, whose efforts to write a 
truly democratic constitution for Rus- 
sia led The Washington Post in 1990 to 
call him "the James Madison of Rus- 
sia." The U.S. National Endowment for 
Democracy awarded his committee 
with a grant and honoured him as a 
feature speaker at its 1991 biannual 
conference (Cohen 1993). 
It was this same Parliament which 
adopted a constitutional amendment 
enabling Yeltsin to become Russia's 
president in 1991, ratified his abolition 
of the Soviet Union in December of 
that year, and empowered him, for 12 
months, to reform the economy by de- 
cree. The media also ignored the com- 
position of Yeltsin's cabinet and his 
body of advisors. Among Yeltsin's key 
advisors, there are a number of promi- 
nent Communist administrators and 
intellectuals. Yegor Gaidar, the archi- 
tect of "shock therapy" in Russia, was 
the economics editof of the Commu- 
nist Party publication, Pravda, until 
1990. Yeltsin's main political adviser, 
Gennady Burbulis, was a lecturer of 
scientific communiusm in Yeltsin's 
hometown of Sverdlc~vsk. 
Former Communist nomenklatura 
members have reaently come to 
power, not only in Moscow, but 
throughout the region. Unlike other 
former Communist block countries 
(such as Poland and Czechoslovakia), 
in which dissidents came to occupy 
government offices, in Russia, those 
who used to be in power in the past 
have taken off their "Communist" hats 
and have become "Democrats." In 
most cases they try hard to deny their 
Communist past. They have embraced 
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the policy of priplatization (especially 
when it gives them an opportunity to 
transfer state prqperty into their own 
pockets) and the9 have defended free- 
dom of religion pnd the press. How- 
ever, their motto St'emains "La loi, test 
moi." Accordin$ to an article which 
was to appear in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
the day after the resistance by Parlia- 
ment supporters was crushed (but was 
censored by the quthorities), power in 
Russia remains iin the hands of the 
nomenklatura which is trying to restrict 
popular politfcal participation 
(Mironov 1993). I 
Parliament supported the transition 
to a market economy, however it 
wanted thistran1tion to proceed more 
slowly than adWcated by Yeltsin's 
advisors. In the 1 ~ t  two years, numer- 
ous disagreements developed be- 
tween Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. 
These disagreembnts were not over the 
major political and economic course 
that the country litad adopted, but over 
specific measure. With all its short- 
comings, Parliament was a legitimate 
institution, able to keep Yeltsin and his 
associates in check. Parliament pre- 
vented Yeltsin fSom arbitrary rule; it 
challenged his decrees and political 
resolutions; it prevented him from 
unilateral decisims on appointments 
and dismissals; it regulated the distri- 
bution of power and privilege; and it 
oversaw changed in social policies and 
other important matters. This is not to 
say that Parliament was a true de- 
fender of the people's interests. Good 
intentions of some deputies notwith- 
standing, Parliament was also inter- 
ested in securing its own power and 
privilege. Whereias in 1991, Yeltsin en- 
joyed an absolute majority in Parlia- 
ment, by the spring of 1993, as little as 
20 percent of Parliament supported his 
measures (KagarJitsky 1993, October 
15). 
It was this *wing opposition to 
Yeltsin's absolute rule that he wanted 
to eliminate once and for all. Yeltsin 
tried to dissolve Parliament in Decem- 
ber 1992 and a@in in March 1993-- 
however, both attempts failed. In 
September Yeltsin became bolder; first 
he evicted Vice-president Rutskoi 
from the Kremlin; and then he dis- 
banded Parliament on September 21; 
finally, Yeltsin quelled the resistance 
of Parliament members and their sup- 
porters who had occupied the White 
House, with a forceful attack using ar- 
tillery on October 4,1993. 
As Boris Kagarlitsky, a former Mos- 
cow City Council deputy and leader of 
the Labour Party suggests, Parliament 
was the author of its own demise; it 
had given Yeltsin emergency powers; 
it had aided in the creation of the heads 
of local administrations with a system 
of presidential appointments; it had 
undermined the rights of the local So- 
viets; it had created the post of Execu- 
tive President of Russia; it hadbrought 
into the government Yegor Gaidar and 
approved his extremist economic poli- 
cies; and it had concentrated unlimited 
power in the President's hands 
(Kagarlitsky 1993, October 15). 
When Yeltsin dissolved Parliament 
and all regional Soviets, it was a decla- 
ration that rule by law no longer ex- 
isted in Russia. By crushing the 
resistance of Parliament members and 
their supporters, Yeltsin confirmed 
that his ruling principle is "might is 
right." He resorted to "gun diplo- 
macy" with the blessing of the West, 
and became the absolute ruler of Rus- 
sia. As John Gray stated, "He [Yeltsin] 
has assumed the powers of a czar and 
begun to act like a czar" (Gray 1993, 
October 20). If the present draft consti- 
tution is approved, Yeltsin will have 
vast powers over security policy and 
personnel. The President would be- 
come the "supreme commander in 
chief" of the armed forces and would 
be able to appoint and remove the 
"high command" of the military, with- 
out consulting the Federal Assembly. 
He will be in a position to form and 
head the Security Council, and would 
have the authority to approve Russia's 
military doctrine (Lepingwell1993). 
A spokesman for the nationalist 
Russian People's Union has observed 
that the draft was "a constitution of an 
almost unrestricted monarchy." Sergei 
Rogov, of the centrist Civic Union criti- 
cized the draft for making the proce- 
dure of presidential impeachment too 
complicated (Tolz 1993, November 
12). 
Political Repression 
Political repression began immedi- 
ately after Yeltsin'svidory whenthou- 
sands of people were detained. The 
Moscow City Council and the regional 
councils were disbanded and some 
deputies were arrested.' The detainees 
were systematically beaten. Press cen- 
sorship was introduced, and a state of 
emergency was imposed on Moscow. 
All the opposition daily newspapers 
were seized or their premises occu- 
pied. Television programs which did 
not reflect the views of the government 
were cancelled. Most of the opposition 
parties were banned, and the rights of 
the trade unions were restricted. The 
Constitutional Court was suspended 
by order of the President. In place of 
the legally elected General Prosecutor 
of Russia, Stepankov, Yeltsin ap- 
pointed his supporter Aleksei 
Kazannik, in violation of all the estab- 
lished procedures. 
After a few days, the repression was 
softened to a degree. Some of the peo- 
ple who had been arrested were re- 
leased, and prior censorship was 
replaced by the threat of reprisals 
against dissident publications 
(Kagarlitsky 1993, October IS). Yeltsin 
dissolved most of the existing local 
councils and removed government 
ministers whose loyalty was in doubt. 
Amnesty International has ex- 
pressed concern about reports that a 
number of known or suspected oppo- 
nents of President Boris Yeltsin have 
been ill-treated while in detention, in- 
cluding two Moscow City Council 
deputies, Boris Kagarlitsky and 
Vladimir Kondratov, and one of the 
leaders of the Russian Party of Labour, 
Alexander Over one thousand 
people were initially detained after 
fighting broke out in Moscow on Octo- 
ber 4-5,1993, but the majority are now 
believed to have been released. How- 
ever, dozens have reported that they 
were beaten while in detention. Am- 
nesty International is also concerned 
about allegations that a number of 
those still detained have not yet been 
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charged, and that at least one has been 
denied access to his lawyer (Naylor 
1993). It has been reported that Sergei 
Baburin, a nationalist member of Par- 
liament, was detained and tortured in 
the Moscow police headquarters, and 
subjected to a mock execution (Larsen 
1993). Vladimir Klebanov, a Brezhnev- 
era dissident and a member of the Con- 
stitutional Committee of the dissolved 
Parliament, was detained by the police 
on October 16,1993, because he did not 
have a domicile registration stamp in 
his passport (GZasnet Info 1993). 
Censorship of the Press 
Media censorship and other forms of 
state repression began immediately 
after the dissolution of Parliament. On 
October 20, 1993, a group of Russian 
journalists accused the security forces 
of arbitrarily beating and arresting 
correspondents during the state of 
emergency in Moscow. Reporters 
stated that during the tragic events of 
October 3 and 4, 1993 in Moscow, 
seven reporters were killed and 76 
were wounded by the militia (Tolz 
1993, October 22, a). 
Parliament's paper, Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, was shut down soon after 
Yeltsin's September 21 suspension of 
Parliament; only to reopen a few days 
later with a new editor and a 
pro-government line. Along with a 
dozen other publications, Pravda, 
which is loosely associated with the 
Communist Party of the Russian Fed- 
eration, and Sovetskaya Rossiya, a pro- 
Soviet nationalist paper, were 
suppressed after the armed clashes of 
October 3 and 4. Pravda and Sovetskay 
Rossiya were required by the Press and 
Information Ministry to be re-regis- 
tered. It was made clear that re-regis- 
tration would be granted only if the 
newspapers changed their names, re- 
placed their editors and softened their 
editorial lines. This was in direct viola- 
tion of the recently adopted Press Law, 
which makes it clear that news publi- 
cations can be shut down or required 
to re-register only for reasons strictly 
defined under a court order (Clarke 
1993, October 29). Pravda reappeared 
on November 2, 1993. Although its 
journalists refused to  change^ the name 
of the paper, they did replace the chief 
editor, Gennadii Seleznev, with Viktor 
Linnik, a former Washington corre- 
spondent for Pravda (Teague and Slater 
1993). 
Additional measures have also been 
taken to stifle criticism of the regime. 
Staff of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a sharp 
and persistent critic of the regime since 
the September 21 dissolution of Parlia- 
ment, have received numerous threats. 
The editor of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
Vitaly Tretyakov, said he was told by 
Press Ministry officials that he may be 
removed as editor and the newspaper 
re-registered as a government organ 
because of its excessively independent 
stance (Clarke 1993, October 29). On 
October 29, an Ostankino TV show, 
"Press-Express," alleged that the au- 
thorities secretly ordered the Russian 
Ministry of Communications not to 
sell subscriptions to this newspaper 
(Wishnevsky 1993, November 2). Simi- 
larly, Independent Television (NTV), 
the first private television company in 
Russia, which started broadcasting 
October 10, 1993, has been under at- 
tackby the Federal Information Centre 
(ibid.). 
Parliamentary Elections 
Having dissolved Parliament, Yeltsin 
called for elections on December 12, 
1993 for the Government Duma, and 
Presidential elections in June 1994. In 
the opinion of some analysts, the 
promise of submitting his own politi- 
cal future to the judgment of Russian 
voters has legitimized his actions in 
recent weeks (Bohlen 1993). Later he 
backed away from an early presiden- 
tial election and decided to stay in 
power until 1996, thus undermining 
the legitimacy of his earlier measure. 
An important question is, 'how free 
are the parliamentary elections going 
to be?' Yeltsin promised that all parties 
running for Parliament would be 
granted equal rights and access to the 
media, but many opposition parties 
have complained that the pro-Yeltsin 
bloc, which includes many key minis- 
ters and specifically the Information 
Minister, has a strong advantage in 
media coverage (Reutcrs 1993). Indeed, 
cies (Clarke 1993, 
the absence of a 
I 
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of competence (Kagarlitsky 1993, No- 
vember 10). 
Moscow News has argued that "the 
number of reports in the state-run elec- 
tronic and print media on the activities 
of the pro-Yeltsin "Russia's Choice" 
bloc is so high that not only the Presi- 
dent's opponents, but even his sup- 
porters from other blocs cannot dream 
of such publiaty. On October 20,1993, 
the newspaper Kommersant criticized 
the Deputy Chief of the presidential 
apparatus, Vyacheslav Volkov, for 
stating, "with full confidence" at an 
October 19,1993 press conference, that 
the party Russia's Choice, would get 
up to 38 percent of seats in the new 
parliament. The newspaper said such 
statements cast doubt on the fairness 
of the election campaign (Tolz 1993, 
October 22, b). 
In an interview with Delovoi Mir on 
October 20,1993, the leader of the re- 
formist Republican Party, Vyacheslav 
Shostakovsky, expressed his concern 
about the bloc's electoral list, which 
includes a number of members of the 
current government. This situation 
was also criticized by the leaders of the 
Russian Movement for Democratic 
Reforms, Gavril Popov and Anatoli 
Sobchak. Shostakovsky said that the 
privileged position enjoyed by Rus- 
sia's Choice, compared to other blocs, 
would likely win it an overwhelming 
majority of seats in the new parlia- 
ment. He said that he feared there 
would be no "constructive opposi- 
tion" in Parliament (Tolz 1993, Octo- 
ber 22, c). 
Various opposition parties have 
complained to observers from the Eu- 
ropean Community of bias and irregu- 
larities in the election campaign. Sergei 
Baburin, the leader of the right-wing 
Russian All-People's Union, said that 
his telephone line had been cut off, 
while Communist Party leader, 
Gennadii Zyuganov, complained that 
his protests to the Russian government 
about media bias had gone unan- 
swered. More serious allegations were 
made by Nikolai Travkin, of the Demo- 
cratic Party, who accused local leaders 
appointed by the President of using 
their office to collect signatures for 
themselves. On November 4, 1993, 
Ostankino TV reported instances of 
paying20,OOO rubles for 100 signatures 
and quoted Arkadii Volsky of the Civic 
Union as saying that other parties were 
buying signatures for packets of ciga- 
rettes (Slater 1993, November 5). 
Yeltsin has ordered a special court 
to be set up to ensure the independ- 
ence and accessibility of the media for 
all candidates in Russia's Parliamen- 
tary elections (Reuters 1993). Given that 
Yeltsin himself appointed the judges 
to this court, it is unlikely that they will 
be able to make impartial decisions. 
Without sufficient time allowed for 
candidates to run their campaigns, and 
without the means to do so, voters will 
still just have to vote for deputies they 
know nothing about, as they did in 
pre-Gorbachev times. 
Even though international obser- 
vers have been invited, the Central 
Electoral Commission has ruled that 
all international observers must be of- 
ficially registered and that if the com- 
mission considers the actions of 
observers to be "incompatible with 
their status," it will be entitled to have 
them deported (Kagarlitsky 1993, No- 
vember 10). 
Lack of Internal and External 
Opposition 
Voices of internal opposition to 
Yeltsin's absolute rule are few and far 
between. A notable exception was an 
open letter signed by eight renowned 
Russian academics, in which they 
stated that Yeltsin's authorities took 
advantage of "the amoral union of 
Rutskoi's supporters with extremist 
and fascist forces" in order to provoke 
violence and establish dictatorial rule. 
Listing a long series of violations of 
human and political rights by Yeltsin's 
regime, the statement calls on "all 
those to whom the free and democratic 
future of Russia is genuinely dear [to 
join in] a broad, non-violent opposi- 
tion bloc" in defense of civil freedoms 
and the rule of law (Clarke 1993, Octo- 
ber 8). Some human rights activists of 
the Brezhnev era have reacted quickly 
to the abuse of civil rights occurring 
throughout the country, but one prob- 
lem is that many of them still remain in 
the background of Russian political 
life. The dissidents of the Brezhnev 
era-those sent to the psychiatric pris- 
ons-have not been rehabilitated, and 
are considered pariahs (Malakhin 
1993). Furthermore, it seems that the 
majority of Russian citizens prefer the 
"iron fist," to democracy, which, ac- 
cording to them, has brought nothing 
but high inflation, impoverishment 
and rising crime. 
Most Western governments have 
applauded Yeltsin's success in crush- 
ing the "hard-liners," which were sup- 
posedly obstructing the transition to a 
market economy. They have been will- 
ing to close their eyes to the abuse of 
human rights and the absence of free 
expression. The U.S. Secretary of State, 
Warren Christopher, even promised 
"technical support" for Yeltsin and $10 
million to stage the election. 
There are several reasons why the 
United States has offered uncondi- 
tional support to Yeltsin. First, the per- 
sistence of the "Cold War" mentality 
has coloured the perception of Rus- 
sia's internal politics, which is still 
viewed in simplistic dichotomous 
terms as a struggle between market 
forces, on the one hand, and "Commu- 
nists," on the other. 
Any form of opposition to the mar- 
ket transition, however mild, is catego- 
rized as "Communist," and actions 
taken by the "market supporters" 
against them are cheered. Second, 
there is a fear that the possible return to 
power of the perceived "hard-liners," 
will put an end to present East-West 
detente and will lead to an escalation 
of the arms race. Third, Yeltsin has 
demonstrated his commitment to 
sweeping market reforms proposed by 
the International Monetary Fund, 
whereas Parliament advocated a more 
cautious approach. Western countries 
have always preferred investing in 
those countries which accept IMF rec- 
ommendations. Given that the United 
States and other Western countries are 
interested in expanding their markets 
in Russia, it is hardly surprising that 
they are willing to support those mem- 
bers of the political elite who can guar- 
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antee favourable conditions for invest- 
ment.3 
Economic Collapse 
Advocates of a market economy ar- 
gued that what the Russian economy 
needed was "shock therapy." The tran- 
sition to a market economy began with 
the sudden removal of price controls 
on January 2, 1992. This provoked a 
rapid increase in prices, which far 
outpaced wage increases, and pushed 
an estimated 85-90 percent of the 
population below the official poverty 
line. 
In 1992, prices increased 2,500 per- 
cent. Soon after the liberalization of 
price controls, industrial production 
collapsed due to the lack of credit to 
pay workers and suppliers. The easing 
of monetary policy in the summer of 
1992 failed to bring a recovery, and by 
the end of the year, Russia's GDP had 
fallen by 22 percent, twice the rate of 
decline in 1991. Consumer spending 
fell by 38 percent. Kiosks offered im- 
ported goods at prices beyond the 
reach of 90 percent of the population 
(The Toronto Star 1993; Kotz 1993). 
The economy continued to falter in 
1993. During the first nine months of 
the year, GDP and industrial output 
were 11 percent and 16.5 percent, re- 
spectively-lower than in the same 
period of 1992 (Bush 1993, November 
4). For most workers, compensation 
has been inadequate and erratic. Real 
per capita incomes have plunged to 
Third World levels, and recent World 
Bank figures rank Russian living 
standards as comparable to those in 
Mexico (Clarke 1993, October 1). Ac- 
cording to the newspaper, Trud, in- 
creases in average wages between 
January 1992 and October 1993 totalled 
only 44 percent of the increase in con- 
sumer prices (Clarke 1993, November 
12). At the same time, the budget defi- 
cit has continued to escalate. 
According to Finance Minister Boris 
Fedorov, the budget deficit for 1993 
could rise to 22.2 trillion rubles, or 14 
percent of GDP, considerably higher 
than the latest target of 17 trillion ru- 
bles or 10 percent of GDP (Bush 1993, 
November 12). 
The head of the Federal Employ- 
ment Service, Fedor Rokopov, stated 
that there were 7O6,OOO people listed as 
officially jobless; 968,000 listed as out 
of work; and 3.7 million on unpaid or 
part-time leave during the first half of 
1993. Prokopov warned that the 
number of unemployed could rise to 
10 to 12 millionin 1994. During the first 
eight months of 1993, a total of 18.1 
billion rubles (roughly $15 million) 
was paid out in unemployment ben- 
efits (Bush 1993, October 22). 
Residents of Russia's urban centres 
are experiencing what might be called 
"financial embarrassment." In a recent 
survey, only one respondent in a hun- 
dred said that his or her family was 
"quite well provided for." A total of 2.6 
percent said their living standards 
were above average, and 26 percent 
believed their families to be of" moder- 
ate means." The rest thought they were 
poor (23.6 percent), and some consid- 
ered themselves "not poor but below 
average" (Kryshtanovskaya and 
Skorobogatko 1993). According to 
Kommersant, a leading Russian busi- 
ness newspaper, only about 2 percent 
of Russians, or three million people, 
have the income to live at a middle- 
class, Western European, level (Covert 
Action Quarterly 1993). A hike in value- 
added taxes and excise taxes on energy 
sources, predicted to be set in place 
after the December 12,1993 elections 
(Clark 1993, November 12), will create 
even more hardships among the Rus- 
sian population. 
The decline in Russia's economy has 
incurred a heavy social cost. In 1992, 
some 250,000 people died in Russia as 
a result of accidents, poisoning, inju- 
ries, and so-called "unnatural causes" 
of death, including murder, suicide 
and alcohol poisoning. Overall mor- 
tality rose by almost 7 percent over the 
year, while the number of "unnatural" 
deaths increased by 20 percent. 
Mortality among teenagers under 
the age of 18 is growing at the fastest 
rate and is directly attributable to 
growing alcoholism and drug abuse. 
Infants also suffer from poor health; in 
1985, one out of every 11 newborns 
was sick, while today one child out of 
every five, is unhealthy (Ivchenko 
1993). 
Rising Crime 
One of the consequences of the transi- 
tion to a market economy has been the 
emergence of organized crime as a cen- 
tral feature of Russian life. As Stephen 
Cohen puts it, economic reforms have 
given rise to a "Klondike 'capitalist' 
profiteering in state goods and natural 
resources - 'corruptalism.'" (Cohen 
1993). An estimated one-third of raw 
material exports are illegal. In the fall 
of 1992, a military transport plane 
loaded with titanium was seized at 
Koltsovo Airport. The scale of illegal 
exporting is demonstrated in Latvia 
which exported 238,000 tons of nonfer- 
rous metals in 1992, although it did not 
produce any. The chairman of Russia's 
central bank has admitted that at least 
$20 billion of the $24 billion of Western 
aid has been illegally taken out of the 
country and deposited in Western 
banks (Kotz 1993). 
According to some reports, the most 
corrupt government institutions are 
the law enforcement agencies, the state 
property administration, the tax office, 
the customs services, and foreign trade 
organizations. According to Alexan- 
der Mikhailov, head of the Public 
Relations Office at the Moscow Ad- 
ministration of the Ministry of Secu- 
rity, almost all the directors of state 
enterprises in the Moscow area had set 
up joint ventures and small businesses 
linked to their state enterprises. There 
are also cases of government bodies 
directly involved in business activities 
(Yasmann 1993). 
Yeltsin made a statement recently 
that Russia is becoming "a Mafia great 
power" (Kotz 1993). This opinion is 
generally shared by the public. In a 
survey of over 1,500 residents of 12 
cities in four Russian regions, over half 
of the respondents could not describe 
the present socio-political system in 
Russia, and 9.2 percent of the respond- 
ents said that the system is character- 
ized by "chaos, anarchy and rampant 
lawlessness." When asked about who 
rules Russia today, almost one-quarter 
of the respondents (23.3 percent) said 
- 
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"Mafia," while only 16.3 percent 
thought it was Yeltsin who ruled Rus- 
sia (Kryshtanovskaya and 
Skorobogatko 1993). 
According to the Department of 
Criminal Statistics, crime has in- 
creased dramatically since the end of 
the Soviet Era. In 1992, 3.8 million 
crimes were committed in the CIS, an 
increase of 24 percent from 1991. The 
number of robberies and assaults rose 
by 50 percent, thefts rose by 58 percent, 
violent crimes rose by 25 percent, and 
murders rose by 40 percent. In the 
same year, 1.6 million people were 
convicted of crimes in the CIS 
(Argumenti i Fakti 1993). 
Yearning for "Iron Fistn 
The growing chaos in the country has 
made the former system of totalitarian 
control look attractive. Moscow City 
Hall Press Centre disseminated a re- 
port that there have been numerous 
appeals to President Yeltsin and 
Mayor Luzhkov from labour collec- 
tives, asking for the state of emergency 
to be extended. According to the 
All-Russia Centre for the Study of Pub- 
lic Opinion on Social and Economic 
Questions, 75 percent of respondents 
surveyed favoured the extension of the 
state of emergency in Moscow, while 
only 16 percent opposed it. What is 
also remarkable about this survey is 
that there were no significant differ- 
ences by age. Moreover, the propor- 
tion of people who agreed to the 
extension of the state of emergency 
was higher among those with higher 
education than among the less edu- 
cated (74 and 69 percent respectively) 
(Izvestia Daily 1993,1,4). 
However, nostalgia for a firm gov- 
ernment does not necessarily reflect a 
preference for Yeltsin and his policies. 
According to Yuri Levada, the best 
known Russian pollster, a bare fifth of 
Russians believe they are better off 
since the start of market reform. Most 
want gradual rather than radical eco- 
nomic reform; and they favour candi- 
dates who will defend the poor over 
those who advocate individualism 
(Gray 1993). According to another poll, 
sponsored by U.S. News and World Re- 
port Magazine, and conducted by Mos- 
cow's Institute for Comparative Social 
Research, less than one-third of Rus- 
sian people said Yeltsin deserved to be 
president again, although about half of 
the 1,000 people sampled replied that 
they approved of the way he was han- 
dling his job (Reuters 1993). 
It seems that to many Russians it 
does not matter who is in power, as 
long as the government is autocratic. 
Nor is there strong opposition to hav- 
ing the Communists in power. Accord- 
ing to yet another opinion poll 
conducted by the Russian TV program 
"Obschchestvennoe mnenie" (public 
opinion) on October 28,1993, 38 per- 
cent of those surveyed supported the 
leader of the Communist Party, 
Gennadii Zyuganov (Rahr 1993, Octo- 
ber 29). 
Scapegoating Ethnic Minorities 
The elimination of political competi- 
tion did not help Yeltsin solve the eco- 
nomic crisis in Russia. Once the 
so-called "hard-liners" were out of the 
picture, other social groups had to be 
blamed for the continued economic 
woes of the Russian population. Such 
scapegoats were easily found. 
Most Russians blame Caucasians 
(those from the Caucasus) for the dra- 
matic rise in crime in Moscow. Gov- 
ernment officials, police and even the 
TV news claim that Caucasians com- 
mit 80 percent of the crimes in Mos- 
cow. In order to fight rising crime, the 
Moscow Police used the state of emer- 
gency as an opportunity to clear the 
city of thousands of Armenians, Geor- 
gians, Azerbaijanis and other unpopu- 
lar ethnic groups from the southern 
Russian republics, who had no domi- 
cile registration permits (propiska). 
Moscow Traffic Police ordered its of- 
ficers to stop all cars, driven by Cauca- 
sians and demand identity papers. 
Police also confiscated cars and de- 
tained and deported their owners. 
Many of the deported people were al- 
ready refugees from Azerbaijan, 
Abkhazia, Georgia, Chechnya and re- 
gions of conflict in the former Soviet 
Union (Gray 1993; Kaplan 1993). The 
harassment of people from these re- 
gions ranged from document checks, 
beatings and extortion, to sweeps of 
the local markets and deportations 
from the capital. Mayor Yury Luzhkov 
seriously aggravated the situation 
with a call on Muscovites to help police 
enforce the state of emergency. ITAR- 
TASS reports that 40,000 residents of 
Moscow signed up as "volunteer 
guards [to] patrol the city" (Moscow 
Times 1993). At one Moscow food mar- 
ket, Russian merchants reportedly 
helped police turn over fruit stands, 
beat and arrest traders from 
Azerbaijan (Akai 1993). 
The operation to clear the city of 
illegal residents was targeted almost 
exclusively at people with dark com- 
plexions. Over 5,000 people were de- 
ported within the first two weeks 
alone, while thousands of illegal resi- 
dents who were ethnic Russians or oth- 
erwise white-skinned, continued to 
enjoy their stay in Moscow. 
This harassment of people of colour 
has been going on for some time in 
Moscow, and indeed such racism has 
always existed in the Soviet Union. 
People of colour are stopped and har- 
assed daily, regularly paying bribes to 
the police to avoid arrest. Now the 
government, using the pretext of the 
propiska system, has institutionalized 
this racism (Akai 1993). 
Once again, the state is blaming eth- 
nic minorities for the economic col- 
lapse and rising crime in the country. 
The people are led to believe that Cau- 
casians, some of whom are involved in 
petty commerce, are responsible for 
soaring prices. At the present time, 
they serve as convenient scapegoats. 
As D. Ostalskiy, Segodnya's editor in 
chief, commented, "it is much easier to 
deport all persons of Caucasian nation- 
ality from Moscow along with south- 
ern vegetables from Moscow markets 
than to engage in the painstaking work 
of eliminating criminal gangs" 
(Ostalskiy 1993,l). 
Once Moscow is "cleansed of these 
people, other visible minorities will 
become victimized by the racist mobs 
inspired by the Police. Already the 
OMON (special purpose militia de- 
tachment) has detained 95 Kurds who 
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were meeting in Moscow's Pushkin 
Square on October 14,1993. Sources at 
the Moscow main Interior Department 
told ZTAR-TASS that the detainment 
was part of the state of emergency ar- 
rangements to expel foreigners with- 
out residence permits from the capital 
(ITAR-TASS 1993). 
Separatist Challenges 
The secessionist movements of the re- 
source-rich regions has been one of the 
biggest challenges to Yeltsin's rule. 
Tatarstan, a large Muslim republic on 
the Volga with some of the largest oil 
reserves in Russia, has declared eco- 
nomic independence. Bashkortostan, 
also Muslim and closely aligned to 
Tatarstan, with 60 percent of Russia's 
oil refining capacity, is also moving 
toward greater independence. A re- 
cent joint session of the Bashkir Su- 
preme Soviet Presidium and Council 
of Ministers reaffirmed that 
Bashkortostan will work toward fur- 
ther sovereignty. Parliament has also 
criticized the decision by Yeltsin's ad- 
ministration to try to deprive the re- 
publics of their sovereignty and to 
preserve the Russian Federation as a 
union (Sheehy 1993, November 9, a). 
Most leaders of other republics have 
protested the fact that Russia's Draft 
Constitution fails to define republics 
as "sovereign states" (Tolz 1993, No- 
vember 12). 
In the north Caucasus, there is one 
oil-rich Muslim republic, Chechnya, 
which has already seceded from Rus- 
sia. Chechnya refused to hold elections 
to the Russian Federal Assembly on its 
territory (Sheehy 1993, November 9, 
b). 
Karelia, a Finnish-speaking repub- 
lic bordering Finland with an abun- 
dance of mineral and forest resources, 
has declared economic independence. 
Sakha-Yakutia, in eastern Siberia, is 
about one-third the size of Canada. It 
has only one million people, but con- 
tains almost all of the former Soviet 
Union's diamonds (12 percent of glo- 
bal production), the second biggest 
gold reserves in Russia, as well as 
newly discovered oil, gas and coal ba- 
sins. Kalmykia is a small, oil-rich Bud- 
dhist republic on the Caspian Sea 
(Rossiyskaya Gazeta 1993; Covert Action 
Quarterly 1993). 
Most regional councils disapproved 
of Yeltsin's decision to suspend Parlia- 
ment. When the latter was defeated on 
October 4, Yeltsin moved directly to 
dissolve regional councils as well, thus 
eliminating political dissent and main- 
taining strong control over resource- 
rich areas. He has also adopted this 
strategy toward the regional councils 
which have demanded more au- 
tonomy. In October, 1993, for instance, 
Sverdlovsk Oblast declared itself a re- 
public within the Russian Federation, 
but on November 9, Yeltsin dissolved 
it-dismissing Governor Eduard 
Rossell from his post and halting all 
activities of the regional soviet (Teague 
1993; Tolz 1993, November 8, a). 
Security Forces 
It is possible that the return to ruling 
with an "iron fist" will revive the secu- 
rity bodies, regardless of who is in 
power. Even before the October crisis, 
the former KGB was regaining some of 
its past power. 
The KGB has broken into domestic 
and foreign operations since the end of 
the Cold War. Most of the domestic 
functions are now with the new Minis- 
try of Security. It is worth pointing out 
that, contrary to popular expectation, 
after the reorganization of the KGB, 
the Ministry of State Security increased 
its personnel by tens of thousands of 
people (Vizhutovich 1993). Fred Weir, 
a Moscow correspondent for seven 
years, said: 
"As far as I know. it's still all there 
and doing everything it used to; per- 
haps more." For example, contrary 
to everything you hear,-any ~ussian 
who wants to obtain a passport for 
travel abroad now needs to obtain a 
razresheniye, or clearance, from the 
Ministry of Security. All that was 
abolished years ago by Gorbachev, 
but it seems that a lot of those old 
functions are being reestablished. 
(Covert Action Quarterly 1993). 
The KGB has infiltrated about 3,000 
members into Soviets at various levels 
(Literaturnaya Gazeta 1993). 
In an attempt to deal with state-level 
corruption, in September 1992, Yeltsin 
issued a decree which authorized the 
posting of several thousand state and 
internal security officers from the 
former KGB Active Reserve to various 
government institutions. According to 
this decree, these officers were to act as 
advisors and consultants under dual 
subordination to the central govem- 
ment and the Ministry of Security 
(Yasmann 1993). However, it appears 
that these officers have been investi- 
gating more than just corruption. In 
June 1993, Brezhnev-era dissident 
writer, Anatoly Pristavkin, observed 
that people were being urged to report 
to the Regimented Secret Organ 
(SO-a branch of the State Security) 
information concerning their col- 
league's relatives living abroad, and 
their ties with foreigners coming to 
Russia (Pristavkin 1993). 
To strengthen its power, in March 
1993, The Russian Federation Ministry 
of Security submitted to the Supreme 
Soviet for consideration a "Draft Law 
on Making Changes in and Additions 
to the Russian Federation Law 'On 
Operational Investigative Activity in 
the Russian Federation'," the Russian 
SFSR Crimiial Code and the RSFSR 
Criminal Procedure Code," and a 
"Draft Law On Federal State Security 
Agencies." Political analysts view this 
as an attempt by the Security to 
reestablish its former absolute power 
(Bespalov 1993). Contrary to the provi- 
sions of the Russian Constitution, the 
law would entitle the Ministry of 
Security to search apartments, bug tel- 
ephones and scan private correspond- 
ence without a warrant from either 
court or public prosecutors. If adopted, 
it would also make it obligatory for 
employees of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to take part in MS operations 
against foreign spies, and would com- 
mit all citizens to serve as the Minis- 
try's secret agents should the latter 
deem this necessary. Moreover, the 
report revealed that the Draft Law in- 
cludes a provision exempting MS 
agents from prosecution for crimes 
they commit in order to preserve their 
anonymity (Wishnevsky 1993, May 
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11). The re-installation of the authori- 
tarian rule may make these proposed 
changes possible and Russia may once 
again return to the era of dissidents 
and political prisoners. 
Potential Refhgees 
In addition to the present flight of refu- 
gees from Russia due to the rise of na- 
tionalism and the persecution of ethnic 
minorities, three other types of refu- 
gees may be expected to emerge from 
Russia. First, it is very likelythat politi- 
cal repression will prompt some dis- 
senters to leave the country. Second, 
under fear of deportation from Mos- 
cow, many refugees from the southern 
countries of the former Soviet Union 
and from the southern regions of Rus- 
sia, will attempt to move westward, 
rather than return south. Finally, the 
independence struggle in some repub- 
lics of the Russian Federation is likely 
to provoke a repressive response by 
Yeltsin, creating yet another group of 
asylum seekers. 
Notes 
The detained deputies include Yuri P. 
Sedykh-Bondarenko, the City Council's 
Deputy Chain- Viktor A. Kuzin, Deputy 
Chairman of the Standing Committee on 
Law, Justice, and the Defense of Civil 
Rights, co-founder of "Memorial," and co- 
founder of the f&st opposition party in the 
Soviet Union, Democratic Union, in 1988; 
Viktor Bulgaltov, a human rights activist 
and a prominent member of the "Memo- 
rial" Society; and Aleksandr Tsopov (Covici 
1993, October 7). 
Segal, Kagarlitsky and Kondratov were 
seized by police on October 3,1993, after the 
failed assault on the Ostankino television 
centre. They had tried to prevent a pointless 
and wtentiallvbloodvattackon the TVcen- 
tre the ~ G s k o i  &d Khasbulatov sup- 
porters. Over the next 24 hours they were 
systematically beaten by police. The detain- 
ees were told they stood accused of com- 
plidty in killing two policemen in order to 
steal their vehicle (Clarke 1993,0ctober26). 
The reaction of some membersof the Ameri- 
can public has contrasted with the official 
response to Yeltsin's repressions. An 
American organization, "The Committee 
for Democratic and Human Rights in Rus- 
sia," was organized to demand respect for 
human rights and freedom of the press, as- 
sembly and political organization for all in 
Russia, and to stop repression of trade un- 
ionists and democratic activists. See 'Rus- 
sian Human Rights Appeal," distributed by 
web.apc.org on November 8,1993. 
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